# CAT’S 1AC

#### Plan Text: The United States federal government should lift its economic sanctions towards the Republic of Cuba.

## Contention One is Oil Spills:

#### Cuban oil drilling *inevitable*. The embargo locks-out US safety experts.

\*a. drilling inevitable - an energy-poor Cuba is exploring its reserves to increase its **energy independence**.

b. huge safety risk – the rigs go deeper than the Deepwater Horizon – the embargo locks out **critical industry expertise**

LaGesse ‘12

David LaGesse¶ reporter, with recent articles that have appeared in National Geographic, Money, and most frequently in U.S. News & World Report – National Geographic News – November 19, 2012 – internally quoting Jorge Piñon, a former president of Amoco Oil Latin America (now part of BP) and an expert on Cuba's energy sector who is now a research fellow at the University of Texas at Austin.– http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/11/121119-cuba-oil-quest/

But an energy-poor Cuba also has its risks. One of the chief concerns has been over the danger of an accident as Cuba pursues its search for oil, so close to Florida's coastline, at times in the brisk currents of the straits, and without U.S. industry expertise on safety. The worries led to a remarkable series of meetings among environmentalists, Cuban officials, and even U.S government officials over several years. Conferences organized by groups like the nonprofit Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and its counterparts in Cuba have taken place in the Bahamas, Mexico City, and elsewhere. The meetings included other countries in the region to diminish political backlash, though observers say the primary goal was to bring together U.S. and Cuban officials.¶ EDF led a delegation last year to Cuba, where it has worked for more than a decade with Cuban scientists on shared environmental concerns. The visitors included former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency administrator William Reilly, who co-chaired the national commission that investigated BP's 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster and spill of nearly 5 million barrels of crude into the Gulf of Mexico. (Related Quiz: "How Much Do You Know About the Gulf Oil Spill?") They discussed Cuba's exploration plans and shared information on the risks.¶ "We've found world-class science in all our interactions with the Cubans," said Douglas Rader, EDF's chief oceans scientist. He said, however, that the embargo has left Cubans with insufficient resources and inexperience with high-tech gear.¶ Although the United States and Cuba have no formal diplomatic relations, sources say government officials have made low-profile efforts to prepare for a potential problem. But the two nations still lack an agreement on how to manage response to a drilling disaster, said Robert Muse, a Washington attorney and expert on licensing under the embargo. That lessens the chance of a coordinated response of the sort that was crucial to containing damage from the Deepwater Horizon spill, he said.¶ "There's a need to get over yesterday's politics," said Rader. "It's time to make sure we're all in a position to respond to the next event, wherever it is."¶ In addition to the environmental risks of Cuba going it alone, there are the political risks. Piñon, at the University of Texas, said success in deepwater could have helped Cuba spring free of Venezuela's influence as the time nears for the Castro brothers to give up power. Raúl Castro, who took over in 2008 for ailing brother Fidel, now 86, is himself 81 years old. At a potentially crucial time of transition, the influence of Venezuela's outspoken leftist president Hugo Chávez could thwart moves by Cuba away from its state-dominated economy or toward warmer relations with the United States, said Piñon.¶ Chávez's reelection to a six-year term last month keeps the Venezuelan oil flowing to Cuba for the foreseeable future. But it was clear in Havana that the nation's energy lifeline hung for a time on the outcome of this year's Venezuelan election. (Chávez's opponent, Henrique Capriles Radonski, complained the deal with Cuba was sapping Venezuela's economy, sending oil worth more than $4 billion a year to the island, while Venezuela was receiving only $800 million per year in medical and social services in return.)¶ So Cuba is determined to continue exploring. Its latest partner, Russia's Zarubezhneft, is expected to begin drilling this month in perhaps 1,000 feet of water, about 200 miles east of Havana. Piñon said the shallow water holds less promise for a major find. But that doesn't mean Cuba will give up trying.

#### *Embargo fails* and stops *pro-active approach* to spills.

\*a. Embargo fails – Vietnam, Malaysia, Venezuela, and Norway will **inevitably drill** off Cuba – the embargo prevents US firms from providing the **necessary expertise** and high-quality equipment

b. Risk of spills – sanctions prevent drilling companies from acquiring **necessary equipment** – that prevents a proactive approach

Helman ’11. Forbes Staff: Southwest Bureau covering Houston, the US energy capital [12/12/11, “U.S. Should Drop Cuba Embargo For Oil Exploration,” Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/u-s-should-drop-cuba-embargo-for-oil-exploration/>]MR

In a few months Spanish oil company Repsol will start drilling for oil off the coast of Cuba, in a spot just 70 miles south of Key West. Soon Repsol–and its JV partners Norway’s Statoil and India’s ONGC–will be joined by rigs from PetroVietnam, Malaysia’s Petronas and Venezuela’s PDVSA. But you won’t see any U.S. companies there. Inexplicably, the U.S. maintains its economic embargo against the Castro regime.¶ This wrong-headed policy represents a dangerous threat to the environment and a huge missed opportunity to the U.S. oil industry. The U.S. embargo will do nothing to prevent oil drilling from taking place in Cuban waters. But it will prevent that work from being done by the most experienced companies with the highest-quality equipment. Norway’s Statoil is a proven operator with a long history in the North Sea and the Gulf. The rest of those companies are just getting started offshore.¶ A group of U.S. lawmakers in September urged Repsol (ticker: REPYY.PK) to call off its Cuba plans or face the threat of U.S. lawsuits. Repsol wisely called that bluff.¶ At least the Obama administration is doing something to ensure that Repsol’s drilling rig is up to snuff. According to an excellent article from Bloomberg today, Repsol’s Chinese-built Scarabeo 9 rig will soon by boarded by four U.S. inspectors (two from the Coast Guard, two from the Dept. of Interior) who will do what they can to check out the rig and watch some drills. But, according to the article, there will be real limits to what the inspectors can inspect. They won’t get to check the rig’s all-important blowout preventor, or the well casing or drilling fluids that are to be used. Though the U.S. inspectors will discuss any concerns they have with Repsol, they will have no enforcement authority.¶ Although the offshore industry’s best service companies and parts manufacturers are right here on the U.S. Gulf coast, Repsol will have to train its people and scrounge for spare parts from the rest of the world.

#### Absent *pro-active* steps, accidents are inevitable. US experts key.

\*Prevention efforts fail – a **disaster is inevitable** because drilling firms don’t have a protocol or **proactive approach** for a spill. Sanctions prevent the US from using its expertise, protocol, and technology.

Bolstad. ’12. Erika Bolstad is a reporter who covers Washington for the Anchorage Daily News, the Idaho Statesman and McClatchy Newspapers. This evidence internally quotes Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors. Hunt, in this instance, is arguably not biased in favor of drilling, as he is speaking to safety and clean-up regimes and he is speaking before a liberal think-tank in favor of human rights [5/10/2012, McClatchy Newspapers, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#.UaoUWpyADq0]

The 50-year-old U.S. embargo of Cuba is getting in the way of safety when it comes to deepwater drilling in Cuban waters, an expert on the communist country’s offshore drilling activity said Thursday.¶ Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, warned that Cold War-era economic sanctions threaten not only Florida’s economy and environment but that of Cuba, too, in the event of a major disaster on the scale of 2010’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The worst-case scenario is "state-sponsored chaos at a disaster site," Hunt said during an event sponsored by the Center for International Policy, a Washington think tank that advocates for a foreign policy based on human rights.¶ The U.S. Coast Guard has extensive response plans, as does the state of Florida. But Hunt said he would give prevention efforts an "F" grade. He likened the work to stocking body bags for a plane crash – but not training pilots to fly safely or to maintain aircraft properly.¶ "We’re getting ready for what will inevitably happen if we don’t take the right proactive steps," Hunt said.¶ His warning and that of other experts came as the Spanish oil company Repsol is about to tap an offshore reservoir beneath 5,600 feet of seawater and about 14,000 feet of rock. The company, the first of many set to drill for oil off Cuba’s coast, is working just 77 nautical miles from Key West.¶ Workers are about a week from completing their drilling and are beginning the technically demanding phase of capping the well and preparing it for possible production, the panelists at the event said.¶ Former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency chief William Reilly, who along with former Florida Sen. Bob Graham co-chaired the presidential commission that examined BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill, said that in his most recent visit to Cuba he was reassured that Repsol was moving slowly in Cuban waters to avoid any surprises. Dan Whittle of the Environmental Defense Fund said that in his visits to Cuba, well-thumbed copies of the commission’s report looked as though they were "read even more in Havana than here."¶ Reilly also noted that Cuban officials are regular readers of daily bulletins from U.S. agencies on U.S. oil drilling regulations. He said he urged them to follow Mexican offshore guidelines – which he said are based on U.S. rules.¶ "Nobody is predicting a catastrophe in association with anything that the Cubans are overseeing," Reilly said. "In every way, the Cuban approach to this is responsible, careful and attentive to the risks that they know they’re undertaking."¶ "Nevertheless, should there be a need for a response . . . the United States government has not interpreted its sanctions policy in a way that would clearly make available in advance the kind of technologies that would be required," Reilly said.

#### Cuban ocean currents spread spill *very fast* and spills are more destructive because it’s *deep water* drilling - Their defense doesn’t apply

Mica 12, Chair, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, January 23, 20**12**, Offshore Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas: The US Coast Guard’s Oil Spill Readiness and Response Planning, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72582/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72582.pdf>p. 2-3 King TS)

But I was quite surprised to learn that, in fact, that the exploratory rigs and drilling platforms were moved into place, and as staff informed me last week that Cuba, in fact, may have already started drilling or will begin drilling. So, that was kind of startling And so, that was kind of a surprise, and I think the most important thing is we find out how we are prepared for this. We have a very unique diplomatic and international strained relationship with Cuba. The Bahamas has been fairly cooperative, and we will hear more about what they are doing with their plans for offshore drilling. The other thing that we will hear is we have some experts that can tell us on the conditions. And this area, I believe it is the Florida Straits, where we have very strong currents, which do feed into the Gulf Stream, and the Gulf Stream is just maybe 20 miles or so off this coast. So, this is not the same as the situation we found ourselves in with the Gulf where currents did not move quite as fast, and the impact might not be as great. So, that was somewhat surprising. The other fact that I have learned is, and we will get this confirmed, is the fact that, again, the purpose of this hearing is to find the facts. But I understand these are deep water exploratory drilling activities at 6,000 feet, which is greater than what we saw with the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf.

#### *Deep water* environments are critical to the overall health of the ocean

Hull 11 **(**Eric V. Hull, Attorney, 2011, "Crude Injustice in the Gulf" UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 29 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1, p. 11 King TS)

Deepwater environments are critically important to the healthy functioning of the world's oceans. Historically, however, environmental concern over marine resources has focused on the coastal waters - near shore areas less than 200 meters deep - where most commercially important marine species are found. This area comprises less than 5% of the world's oceans, and its health and productivity depend on the remaining 95% of the deepwater ocean. In fact, a large fraction of biodiversity and biomass production in coastal areas is directly linked to and dependent upon deep sea ecosystems. Although relatively little is known about inhabitants of deep sea environment, those organisms studied to date show common traits of slow growth, late maturity, slow reproduction, long life (200 years in some cases), and low productivity. These traits have important implications for the sustainable management and use of deep-sea resources. Absent effective management strategies, deepwater species and their associated ecosystems can quickly be depleted below sustainable levels. UNEP recommended that governments incorporate precautionary approaches to manage deepwater environments that take into account the full range and cumulative effects of potential human activities and impacts, and added, "the conservation and sustainable use of the vulnerable ecosystems and biodiversity in deep waters and high seas are among the most critical ocean issues and environmental challenges today."

#### Cuba’s marine areas are the foundation of global marine biological diversity and sustain ecosystems world-wide – it’s a *hotspot*

Whittle. 12’. Dan Whittle is EDF’s Cuba Program Director for the Oceans Program and is featured on CenterforDemocracyInAmerica.org [9/11/2012, “Bridging the Gulf Report: Preparing for Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration in Cuba,” <http://blogs.edf.org/edfish/2012/09/11/bridging-the-gulf-report-preparing-for-offshore-oil-and-gas-exploration-in-cuba/>]MR

The United States has a vested interest in the health of Cuba’s natural environment for an underlying reason: “location, location, location.” Aligning with the principle that “nature knows no political borders,” the United States shares extensive and important elements of biodiversity at large spatial scales with Cuba, Mexico, and the Bahamas, due to geographical proximity and prevailing ocean currents. Three major linked ocean currents in the Gulf Basin—the Gulf Loop Current, Florida Current, and the Gulf Stream—create a “highway in the sea” that facilitates dispersal and exchange of diverse aquatic organisms and populations between Cuban and U.S. territorial waters. The most dominant current, the Gulf Loop, is a current of warm water from the Caribbean that travels northward from the Yucatan Straits to the Florida Straits. The Gulf Loop creates a clockwise loop along the West Florida Shelf, where it becomes the Florida Current.7 After traveling eastward from the Gulf of Mexico through the Florida Straits, the Florida Current shifts northward to power the Gulf Stream, which travels along the U.S. East Coast and is deflected into the North Atlantic. The Gulf Loop naturally evolves, elongating to the north nearly to the coast of Louisiana before bending back on itself, forming a central gyre, which is then pushed off into the western Gulf. The movement of these currents underscores the level of shared resources and high connectivity between the United States and Cuba. Managing U.S. southeast fisheries “downstream” is incomplete if managers neglect to protect the key spawning and nursery grounds upstream in the Caribbean, including Cuba, that are the lifeline for important elements of the multibillion-dollar commercial and recreational fisheries in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, management (or mismanagement) of marine resources in the United States also impacts Cuba’s economy and environment given our reciprocal relationship. Cuba’s extensive coral reefs, seagrass meadows, and mangrove forests provide vital habitat for snapper, grouper, and other reef fishes that spawn to send larvae towards the United States. The shared Gulf of Mexico also provides spawning sites and foraging habitats for migratory species that are economically valuable to U.S. fisheries, including tunas, sharks, and billfishes. Other migratory species whose population numbers are imperiled—such as the endangered Florida manatee, whale sharks (classified as ‘vulnerable’ by the IUCN), endangered sea turtles such as the Hawksbill, and the highly depleted Atlantic bluefin tuna—travel unimpeded between Cuban and U.S. waters. It is also likely that the two countries share an ancient deepwater coral ecosystem that encompasses more than 25,000 square miles—ranging as far north as North Carolina—and makes up one of the world’s largest known areas of healthy deep sea coral. In June 2010, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) approved a plan to ban the use of destructive bottom-trawling fishing gear in the U.S. South Atlantic portions of this ecosystem to safeguard the reefs and the commercial fisheries that rely on them.8 The interdependency of our ecosystems—and the resulting economic ramifications—reinforces the notion that environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba is an imperative.

#### Biodiversity in *specific hotspots* checks extinction. Key to *ag*, *medicine*, and *ecosystems*

\*Biodiversity key – a) disease – species diversity is key to discovering cures for **dangerous pathogens**

b) ag – varied species provide genes to improve agricultural resilience and sustain our food supply

c)ecosystems – biodiversity in the **key hotspots** is key to prevent a **total collapse** of ecosystems

Mittermeier ‘11

(et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of Conservation International and he is considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots – F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5\_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at: http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global\_biodiversity\_conservation\_the\_critical\_role\_of\_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is¶ irreversible. Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a¶ thousand or more times the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶ (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of every¶ human. Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for¶ cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶ Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration¶ for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries without knowing the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems¶ that support humans and all life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶ inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget – perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally ﬂexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented ﬁrst? The ﬁeld of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was the ﬁrst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest “hotspots” on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a ﬁrst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (¶ >¶ 0.5% of the world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientiﬁc publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-deﬁned criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redeﬁned several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufﬁcient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.

## Contention 2 is Relations:

#### Only *full removal* of the embargo solves – the current policy is causing anti-americanism, terrorism, and risks a crisis – partial or conditioned removal is worse than the status quo.

Gorrell 05 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army War College [Lieutenant Colonel Tim Gorrell, Cuba: The Next Unanticipated Anticipated Strategic Crisis?, Strategy Research Project, 18 March 2005, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074]

RETAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA, BUT ENFORCE THEM IN VARYING DEGREES DEPENDING ON THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND THE CUBAN REGIME’S CONDUCT IN REGARD TO AMERICAN INTERESTS Throughout the past 15 years, the U.S. has experimented with a variable enforcement option. During the Clinton administration, restrictions were occasionally eased. For example, in March 1998, President Clinton announced: 1) the resumption of licensing for direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba; 2) the resumption of cash remittances up to $300 per quarter for the support of close relatives in Cuba; 3) the development of licensing procedures to streamline and expedite licenses for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment; and 4) a decision to work on a bipartisan basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban people.33 In January 1999, President Clinton ordered additional measures to assist the Cuban people, which included further easement of cash remittances, expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba, reestablishment of direct mail service, authorization for the commercial sale of food to independent entities in Cuba, and an expansion of people-to-people exchanges (i.e. scientist, students, athletes, etc.)34 This policy ended when the new administration failed to see any reciprocal progress from Castro. Fragmenting the policy process may do more harm than good. It does too little too late and causes hard feelings among Cubans and American businesses. The carrot-stick diplomatic approach will not make Castro yield. Such policy breeds inconsistency as it can vary from administration to administration, as it has between the Clinton and Bush administrations. The rules constantly change and thus have a ripple effect on American businesses and the quality of life of Americans, Cuban-Americans and native Cubans. Cuban trade has already declined to a trickle since the Bush administration sought to further squeeze the Castro government. Prior to the Bush administration’s trade crack down, 2004 was emerging as a record year for U.S. imports to Cuba. By the end of December 2004 U.S. suppliers and shippers were projected to have earned some $450 million, a 20% increase over 2003 sales.35 Imposing restrictions, as the Bush administration did in June 2004, perplexed American businesses with unpredicted problems. These businesses make adjustments, as do Cuban- American citizens, then must abruptly alter their business strategies because of a Congressional vote or an Executive order. This political tug-of-war does not move the U.S. any closer to realizing its security objectives. On the Cuban American front there is eroding support for this U.S. policy position. In the 2000 presidential election, President Bush won 81% of south Florida’s Cuban-American vote. A recent poll by the William C. Veleasquez Institute-Mirram Global indicates that his support today has fallen to 66%.36 This decline signals a negative response to policy that limits travel, restricts the amount of goods people can bring to their relatives, and places limitations on sending money to family in Cuba. Cuban-Americans believe that this only hurts their poor relatives in Cuba. According to Jose Basulto, head of Brothers to the Rescue, and Ramon Raul Sanchez, head of the anti-Castro Democracy Movement, the U.S. government is using the Cuban people to harass Castro.37 Applying policy in a give-and-take manner, accomplishes little to facilitate the fall of Castro. The Cuban people enjoy brief periods of limited benefits, only to have these benefits withdrawn should the President or members of Congress wish to take another jab at Castro. American civilian businesses are also negatively affected. LIFT ALL SANCTIONS AND PURSUE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA Normalcy is the only policy that the U.S. has not attempted. The present policy misses the security implications, alienates allies and others worldwide, harms U.S. businesses, and is losing support domestically. First, the U.S. must reassess the threat posed by Cuba. There is, in fact, virtually no security threat. Further, policies that were applicable in the past, when there was a threat, should not be applied to the current environment. The U.S. Cuban policy is perplexing because it appears to conflict with the ends, ways and means that the National Security Strategy is applied in other regions of the world. The U.S. has normalized relations with Vietnam and Libya and has certainly opted for an open dialogue with Communist China. Likewise, there is abundant evidence that a new policy toward Cuba could very well achieve the ends that 43 years of embargo have failed to accomplish. Secondly, Cuba currently trades and has diplomatic ties with much of the world. The goal of U.S. sanctions is to isolate the Cuban regime; however, they have only slowed, not deterred economic growth. On 4 November 2003 the United Nations voted, for the 12th straight year, 173 to 3 (with 4 abstentions) against the four-decade U.S. embargo against Cuba.38 Voting with the U.S. were Israel and the Marshall Islands. The U.S.’ staunchest allies, the 15 members of the European Union, along with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, all object to the “extra-territorial” effect of U.S. legislation that they feel violates their sovereignty. 39 There are two schools of thought regarding trade and democracy. The first is that economic growth will promote democracy. The other questions this notion and argues that democracy must come first.40 There is strong opinion, however, that in Cuba’s case economic engagement will bring about the desired results. Certainly many Cuban-Americans and perhaps some others in the world would not agree with this course of action. However, there is evidence that a significant number of people both within the U.S. and abroad favor a policy change. In 1992 a pastoral letter from Cuba’s Bishops stated that the US embargo “directly affects the people who suffer the consequences in hunger and illness. If what is intended by this approach is to destabilize the government by using hunger and want to pressure civic society to revolt, then the strategy is also cruel.“41 The third consideration is U.S. business. Under the current rules, U.S. businesses are permitted to sell agricultural produce to Cuba.42 Today 27 firms from 12 U.S. states are doing business with Cuba, making Cuba 22nd among U.S. agricultural markets.43 These business activities are greatly influenced by Cuban-Americans and members of Congress. The economic power of the U.S. can be our most powerful weapon. The possibilities of economic engagement offer a myriad of branches and sequels that could promote a rapport between the American people and the Cubans. The aggressive pursuit of these endeavors would go far in ensuring an orderly transition to a post-Castro Cuba. It is an erroneous assumption to believe that Castro’s demise will miraculously trigger reform and all the problems of the last 40 years will vanish. A visionary policy, albeit constrained within the parameters of the Castro regime, will go far in setting agreeable social-economic conditions in Cuba both now and in the future. Finally, public opinion in the U.S. favors a new policy direction. A 1997 Miami Herald poll found that a majority of Cubans under the age of 45 supported “establishing a national dialogue with Cuba,” whereas for the most part their elders opposed such dialogue.44 Former President Jimmy Carter, writing in the Washington Post after his May 2002 visit to Cuba, reported that he found an unexpected degree of economic freedom. Carter went on to say that if Americans could have maximum contact with Cuban, then Cubans would clearly see the advantages of a truly democratic society and thus be encouraged to bring about orderly changes in their society. 45 Castro himself appears willing to consider greater reform. In 1998 he permitted Pope John Paul II to visit Cuba; Cubans are permitted to own property; he has opened trade; and in 2002 he broadcast former President Jimmy Carter’s address at the University of Havana.46 Additionally, he indicated that the Cuban government would return any of the Guantanamo detainees in the unlikely event that they would escape.47 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION U.S. policy makers need to confront the real Cuba of today in order to build a “free” Cuba of tomorrow that is capable of taking its place in the world community as a responsible, democratic nation. Given the history of the past 100 years, and particularly our Castro centric policy, the U.S. needs to make a bold change toward Cuba. The U.S. has pursued a hard-line approach toward the Castro regime for over 40 years. While this policy was easily justified during the Cold War era and, to a certain degree, during the 1990s, it fails to address the present U.S. national security concerns. The globalization trends of the 21st century are irreversible, Fidel Castro is in the twilight of his life, and a new generation of Cuban-Americans is supportive of new strategies that will ease the transition to a post-Castro Cuba while buttressing economic and social opportunities in the near term. Furthermore, there is a new dimension that U.S. policy strategists must take into account in deciding the course of U.S.- Cuba relations – the GWOT. World-wide asymmetrical threats to U.S. interests, coupled with the Iraqi occupation and the potential for any one of the present hot spots (i.e. Iran, North Korea, Taiwan, etc.) to ignite, should prompt strategic leaders to work harder to mitigate a potential Caribbean crises. The prudent action would then be to develop strategies that can defuse or neutralize these situations before they require the U.S. to divert resources from protecting its interests in the GWOT. Therefore, the U.S. can best serve its security, the Cuban people, and the Western Hemisphere by abandoning the present draconian policy toward Cuba. The U.S. should implement a new policy designed to achieve its goals through lifting all sanctions and pursuing normalized diplomatic relations; encouraging people-to-people dialogue and trade. The policy should continue to pursue human rights, democracy, and free market ends. However, the ways to realize these objectives should be grounded in full economic engagement, an approach that has not been fully attempted. The present U.S. policy has failed miserably. What does the most powerful nation on earth have to lose by attempting a bold shift in its policy toward Cuba?

#### Cuba key to all Latin American relations, and Castro’s willing to talk

Sweig, August 2013 (Sweig is a writer for the council of foreign relations, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, “Cuba After Communism” < http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>) nicole

The geopolitical context in Latin America provides another reason the U.S. government should make a serious shift on Cuba. For five years now, Obama has ignored Latin America's unanimous disapproval of Washington's position on Cuba. Rather than perpetuate Havana's diplomatic isolation, U.S. policy embodies the imperial pretensions of a bygone era, contributing to Washington's own marginalization. Virtually all countries in the region have refused to attend another Summit of the Americas meeting if Cuba is not at the table. Cuba, in turn, currently chairs the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which excludes Washington. The Obama administration has begun laying out what could become a serious second-term agenda for Latin America focused on energy, jobs, social inclusion, and deepening integration in the Americas. But the symbolism of Cuba across the region is such that the White House can definitively lead U.S.–Latin American relations out of the Cold War and into the twenty-first century only by shifting its Cuba policy. To make such a shift, however, Washington must move past its assumption that Havana prefers an adversarial relationship with the United States. Raúl Castro has shown that he is not his brother and has availed himself of numerous channels, public and private, to communicate to Washington that he is ready to talk. This does not mean that he or his successors are prepared to compromise on Cuba's internal politics; indeed, what Castro is willing to put on the table remains unclear. But his government's decisions to release more than 120 political prisoners in 2010 and 2011 and allow a number of dissident bloggers and activists to travel abroad this year were presumably meant to help set the stage for potential talks with the United States.

#### Ending the embargo would expand credibility, US soft power, and improve US-Cuban relations.

Hinderdael 11 M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>]

Conclusion

The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.

In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52

At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Independently - Soft Power limits the size and frequency of conflicts around the world.

Nye 96 Professor of International Relations – Harvard University [Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1995/1996, “Conflicts After the Cold War,” Washington Quarterly, 19:1, Winter]

Leadership by the United States, as the world's leading economy, its most powerful military force, and a leading democracy, is a key factor in limiting the frequency and destructiveness of great power, regional, and communal conflicts. The paradox of the post-cold war role of the United States is that it is the most powerful state in terms of both "hard" power resources (its economy and military forces) and "soft" ones (the appeal of its political system and culture), yet it is not so powerful that it can achieve all its international goals by acting alone. The United States lacks both the international and domestic prerequisites to resolve every conflict, and in each case its role must be proportionate to its interests at stake and the costs of pursuing them. Yet the United States can continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions to pursue shared security interests, whether or not the United States itself supplies large military forces. The U.S. role will thus not be that of a lone global policeman; rather, the United States can frequently serve as the sheriff of the posse, leading shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns within the legitimizing framework of international organizations. This requires sustained attention to the infrastructure and institutional mechanisms that make U.S. leadership effective and joint action possible: forward stationing and preventive deployments of U.S. and allied forces, prepositioning of U.S. and allied equipment, advance planning and joint training to ensure interoperability with allied forces, and steady improvement in the conflict resolution abilities of an interlocking set of bilateral alliances, regional security organizations and alliances, and global institutions.

#### Latin American relations needed to combat global. Only engagement solves

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

The Need for a Hemispheric Partnership

Historically, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional—let alone global—challenges. Mutual distrust is partly to blame. Also, the LAC countries were often not ready to make stable commitments. The United States had other preoccupations and did not make hemispheric partnership a priority. Problems and solutions were seen from Washington as country-specific and were managed mostly on a country-bycountry basis through bilateral channels. Meanwhile, multilateral forums—such as the Organization of American States and the summits of hemispheric leaders—ran out of steam, became mired in confrontation, or remained underresourced.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.

It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits.

Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future.

For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

The second change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their international economic relations. Their range of trading and investment partners is expanding, with China in particular playing a prominent role in the region. Chinese imports from the LAC countries increased twentyfold between 1990 and 2005, while Chinese exports to the region grew even faster, from $620 million in 1990 to $37 billion in 2005. Latin America is also attracting significant foreign investment from nontraditional sources. Between just 2003 and 2005, the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in the LAC region increased by 40 percent. China has become a key buyer of commodities, driving up prices and reversing the long-term decline in the region’s terms of trade. Meanwhile, the Caribbean countries have recently signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union, immediately opening all European markets and gradually opening Caribbean ones. With more valuable exports and less expensive manufactured imports, living standards in the LAC region have improved significantly.

At the same time, many LAC countries have moved beyond their traditional reliance on resources from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil now enjoy investment-grade status from credit-rating agencies and in recent years have been able to raise capital readily in international markets. The same is true of several other countries, including Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay, which until the recent financial crisis enjoyed ready access to private international capital. Regionally owned institutions, such as the Andean Development Corporation and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, have also reduced the region’s dependence on traditional sources of capital.

Some Latin American countries are investing abroad on an unprecedented scale. In 2006, for example, Brazil invested more abroad ($28 billion) than it received in foreign direct investment ($19 billion). In Chile, private pension funds and the government have become active international investors. Surpluses have allowed Venezuela to inject billions of dollars into other countries, particularly through subsidized oil exports. Many Latin American multinationals—such as Brazil’s Vale, Gerdau, and Odebrecht; and Mexico’s CEMEX, America Movil, and Grupo FEMSA—have become global corporate giants. The current crisis may no doubt affect the relative magnitude of these investments, but economic relationships in the hemisphere will continue to diversify as the world economy recovers.

The third change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their political and diplomatic relations. The most notable example is Brazil, which has opened thirty-two new embassies in the past five years. Together with Venezuela, Brazil is playing a more active political role in the region through the Union of South American Nations, which is already active at the presidential level and is expected to become a key forum for the discussion of defense issues. Mexico and Brazil are also playing prominent roles in international forums and organizations, including the finance ministers’ Group of Twenty and the trade ministers’ Group of Twenty. Brazil has announced its intention to join the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries and the Paris Club. Chile and Brazil are expected to become members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the not-too-distant future. Mexico, Peru, and Chile are active members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In sum, this diversification of political and economic relations reflects many LAC countries’ new confidence in their capacity to chart their own course in the world.

Their enhanced confidence and autonomy will make many LAC countries much less responsive to U.S. policies that are perceived as patronizing, intrusive, or prescriptive, and they will be more responsive to policies that engage them as partners on issues of mutual concern. Also, the LAC countries’ diversification of economic and political relations means that Washington will have to compete with governments both outside and within the region for regional influence. In particular, Brasília and Caracas are both vying for leadership in South America; and though they may have different visions for regional integration and different ways to approach other governments, they agree that Washington should play a more limited role in their part of the world.

The fourth change is that, today, the LAC countries are better positioned to act as reliable partners. Despite remaining governance challenges, the vast majority of these countries are stable democracies for which competitive elections and peaceful transitions of power are the norm, not the exception. Throughout these countries, civil society groups now participate extensively in the policymaking process, and there is much less tolerance of violence as a means of political expression.

Economic progress has also made the LAC countries more reliable partners. Leaders, including some on the left, are committed to fiscal responsibility. Most central banks are now independent bodies focused on inflation control. Exchange rates largely reflect market forces. As a result, many LAC countries can now look beyond their borders and commit to sustained partnerships and responsibilities on regional and global issues.

In sum, the countries of the LAC region have made significant strides in economic and social development and will continue to prosper even if U.S. leaders remain disengaged. Washington must decide whether it wants to actively reengage and benefit from the region’s dynamism and resources or be sidelined as other economic and political actors fill the void left by its absence.

#### Scenario 1 is Prolif

#### Proliferation risks nuclear conflict—inexperienced nations will be more likely to use their nukes

Horowitz 9­­—Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania [Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009 pg. 234-257]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go – given the new risk of nuclear escalation – and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses. 3

What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether or not actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior – shifts in uncertainty – on the part of potential adversaries.

Learning to Leverage?

When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Though nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo.

This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, system-wide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil-military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan, Feaver, and Blair suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1993). Sagan contends that civil-military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision-making towards more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999).

Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators, and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation, the “use it or lose it” mindset, may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, like launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995). 4

Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make them more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.5 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges.

The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenal is likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases where their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate.

Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short-term nuclear proliferation is likely to increase uncertainty about the trajectory of a war, the balance of power, and the preferences of the adopter.

#### Scenario 2 is Warming

#### Ignore warming critics – action is key, the science is indisputable

Pittock 10—led the Climate Impact Group in CSIRO until his retirement in 1999. He contributed to or was the lead author of all four major reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. He was awarded a Public Service Medal in 1999 and is CSIRO Honorary Fellow. (Barrie, Climate Change: The Science, Impacts, and Solutions, 2010, pg. 240)

Is the science credible?

As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, there are many uncertainties in relation to climate change. Nevertheless, the overwhelming body of evidence from relevant scientists is that there is a high probability that human-induced global warming, with associated changes in other climatic conditions, is happening. Moreover, the evidence is that warming will continue, at an accelerating pace, through the twenty-first century and beyond, unless urgent measures are taken to slow and eventually reverse the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

These conclusions are hotly contested by a relatively small number of contrarians, discussed in Chapter 4, who for various reasons accuse so-called "˜establishment scientists' of bias and poor science. Genuine sceptics exist and are welcomed, as they keep scientists on their toes and ensure that what is accepted is well based and relevant to the real world. However, contrarians often present misleading arguments, and frequently seize upon any discussion of uncertainty as an excuse for dismissing the whole topic, rather than arguing for a balanced policy of risk management. Too often contrarians repeat old arguments that have already been thoroughly discredited.

#### Warming risks extinction

Tickell 08 (Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange>)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

#### Scenerio 3 is Cuba Instability

#### Embargo ruins Cuba – sets the stage for multiple escalation points

Ratliff & Fontaine 2k (Ratliff, William - research fellow at Stanford University, PhD (Chinese/Latin American histories) from U of Washington; Roger Fontaine. Former Director of Latin American Affairs, National Security Council.) "A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean." Lift the Embargo on Cuba (2000). p13-15

The present study supports a reversal in U.S. policy because the embargo now

1. Polarizes Cubans in Cuba and abroad; thus to the extent that the pressure is signiﬁcant it increases the prospects for an eventual civil war rather than the “peaceful transition” U.S. leaders say they seek, and this in turn raises the prospects of a costly U.S. military intervention in Cuba to prevent Castro from crushing the reformers.33

2. Sets the stage for innumerable small encounters that could escalate. For example, what if the bomber on 1 January 2000 had dropped explosives rather than leaﬂets, or if Castro had shot him down as he did two Cessnas that allegedly overﬂew Cuban territorial waters in 1996? As it was, Castro sent up two MiGs and the United States launched an F-16. The ﬂight was not illegal under U.S. law, and since many in Miami hailed it as a heroic act, the same thing could easily happen again. Also, Cuban American hawks closed down parts of Miami and stoked international tensions, calling the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) decision in early January 2000 to send Elia´n Gonza´lez back to his father in Cuba a sellout to Castro. The abandon with which many advocates of family values cast aside the rights of the boy’s father shows how politicized this matter has become.

3. Encourages determined pressure groups to lobby a constantly compromising U.S. executive and Congress in such a way as to threaten the essential interaction of several branches of the government in the analysis and defense of U.S. interests.

4. Antagonizes our allies around the world, complicating cooperation on other important issues.

5. Sets the stage for new generations of hostility between Cubans and Americans because of the imperialistic demands of the Torricelli Act and especially the Helms-Burton Law.

6. Serves more than it than impedes Castro’s own interests by providing a scapegoat for his hopeless economic policies and continuing domestic repression, making him the target of a U.S. vendetta that is condemned by the rest of the world and thus enables him to maintain at least a vestige of his all-important self-portrayal as a deﬁant warrior against “U.S. imperialism.”

7. Imposes at least some degree of additional hardship on the Cuban people with no evidence that these hardships will improve their living conditions now or in the foreseeable future. Washington claims its policy is on behalf of the Cuban people, though there is no signiﬁcant evidence that the Cuban people support the embargo and many indications that they do not. Even the majority of activists reportedly want it lifted.34

8. Makes critically important cooperation between and among Cubans in Cuba and abroad in the eventual post-Castro period more difﬁcult to achieve.

9. Has at least a better chance of opening up society and the economy than current policy, which does nothing of the sort.

10. Is so cluttered with contradictions and inconsistencies it has become a dishonest, embarrassing, and pernicious policy unworthy of the United States. A few embargo supporters try to defuse criticism by maintaining that sanctions are valuable because they can “weaken a target country” even if they don’t “bring surrender on key issues.” According to an analyst featured in a CANF newsletter, the critics of the embargo have “set the bar too high.”35 But that bar—the proclaimed goals of the embargo—is the one set by the U.S. government and most supporters of the sanctions, not by the critics who simply measure the policy against its stated objectives.

#### Embargo causes civil war, pulls in US

Ratliff & Fontaine 2k (Ratliff, William - research fellow at Stanford University, PhD in Chinese/Latin American histories from U of Washington; Roger Fontaine - Former Director of Latin American Affairs, National Security Council.) "A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean." Lift the Embargo on Cuba (2000).p38-39

Inciting an Insurrection

The strategy of U.S. policy is to make life evermore difﬁcult in Cuba so that Castro will make reforms or the Cuban people will rise up and throw him out. Many acknowledge that the embargo doesn’t accomplish either of these objectives, but what would happen if it did spark significant protests? Would that truly be desirable? According to a former Interior Ministry ofﬁcial, the protests would be countered by “violent repression by the state apparatus. The situation could degenerate into a massacre and begin a devastating civil war.”78 A poll conducted in 1997 by Florida International University and the Miami Herald showed some 66 percent of Cuban Americans favoring U.S. military action to overthrow Castro and 71 percent supporting military action against Castro by Cubans in exile.79 But, as noted above, a recent Gallop poll showed that only 42 percent of Americans in general support even the embargo, much less a military operation. Our conclusion in talking with many Americans over the past decade is that few have any idea what the issues are and that support would plummet if people knew the facts or thought substantial numbers of Americans might be sent to die in or for Cuba. Nor would the U.S. military want to become involved in a conﬂict in a country that poses no strategic threat to the United States according to its own and other U.S. intelligence analyses. But, even if U.S. domestic opinion opposed intervention, signiﬁcant losses by antiCastro forces during a general uprising or civil war—the reaction we have been encouraging—would result in enormous pressure on Washington to send military support to preserve those who remain and ﬁnally end Castro’s rule. Support for Reformers Some embargo supporters believe that pressures by the United States strengthen reformers within Cuba. Two eminent embargo supporters are concerned that ending the embargo might mean that reformers would be swallowed up by hard-liners, though one also notes that even if the sanction supporters carry out reforms there is nothing to stop Castro from reversing reforms at will even as the sanctions continue.80 In fact Castro sometimes reverses “reforms,” such as they are, or arrests and sentences Cubans, seemingly in direct response to tougher—or milder—U.S. actions. Hufbauer is probably more nearly correct when he concludes that “when sanctions are applied broadside—as against Haiti, Cuba and Iraq—the hardest hit are the most vulnerable. . . . Left unharmed, and often strengthened, are the real targets: the political, military and economic elites.”81 In 1999 Elizabeth Gibbons, head of the UNICEF ofﬁce in Haiti between 1992 and 1996, found a similar consequence of the multilateral embargo on that smaller island.

#### Unstable Cuba risks terrorism and US invasion – destroys democracies throughout the region.

Gorrell 05 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army War College [Lieutenant Colonel Tim Gorrell, Cuba: The Next Unanticipated Anticipated Strategic Crisis?, Strategy Research Project, 18 March 2005, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074]

In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.

## Solvency:

#### Plan is *effective*, *topical*, and *US firms would say “yes”*.

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 125-26

There are numerous areas in the energy sector in which the United States and Cuba can and should cooperate: exploration, energy production, downstream operations, transportation, and auxiliary services. In addition, the opportunity for U.S. firms to invest directly in the development of Cuban energy resources should be created. Recent history shows that Cuba possesses the potential to be a strong regional trade partner in the area of energy and infrastructure development. It might be premature for U.S. firms to begin opening branch offices along Avenida Quinta in the Miramar district of Havana, but it is rational to consider the benefits that would be drawn from the expansion of trade and cooperation between Cuba and the United States in energy development. There will be obvious limitations on such investment opportunities because of the empresa mixta joint-venture model that the Cuban government employs, but as previously stated, international oil companies are not averse to adjusting their investment models to specific market conditions, and in the case of Cuba it would be no different. In fact, there has been no lack of interest on the part of American international oil firms in developing a Cuban market. The prevailing Cuban model of joint-venture investment and cooperation has proved to be attractive internationally, and there are numerous opportunities in this area for American firms as soon as there are significant changes in the Cuban embargo so that this type of engagement can occur.

#### Action now is key – removing the embargo would boost overall Latin relations and undermine the perception of US isolation globally

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[\*193] One of the lasting legacies of America's Cuba policy is that it isolates the U.S. and represents stubbornness in the face of ineffectiveness. After the 2008 election the calls to change U.S. policy toward Cuba were echoed by both allies and non-allies, including Brazil, n9 Colombia, n10 and Mexico, as well as Venezuela n11 and Bolivia. n12 The European Union has also expressed its opposition to "the extraterritoriality extension of the United States embargo." n13 Each year the UN considers a resolution condemning America's economic embargo of Cuba, and each year the measure is overwhelmingly adopted. In 2008 the vote was 184-4, meaning the U.S. policy to isolate Cuba has had the ironic effect of isolating the United States. Additionally, the travel ban may violate multiple articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. n14 Fortunately, for three reasons, the opportunity is ripe for a fresh approach to this old problem.

First, leadership changes in both countries allow each to signal a new way forward without necessarily repudiating long-held positions. Both governments have signaled a willingness to talk, which is already a step in the right direction. Specifically, within the United States, demographic changes in the Cuban-American community have led to attitudinal changes toward U.S.-Cuban relations. Florida International University's yearly polls have shown a trend whereby an increasing number of Cuban-Americans are opposed to the current U.S. policy of economic and political isolation.

In 2008, those polls indicated that a majority of Cuban-Americans opposed the restrictions on family travel and remittances. n15 These polls also indicated that long-term demographic trends are breaking in the Democrats' favor: the divide is now between older Cuban Americans who still vote Republican, and the younger generation, increasingly more numerous, who lean Democrat. Not only did President Obama outpace Senator John Kerry's [\*194] 2004 performance by ten points, but he won the twenty-nine or younger Cuban-American vote with fifty-five percent. n16 This shift in public opinion, combined with the fact that President Obama won Florida's electoral votes during the 2008 election despite narrowly losing the Cuban vote, gives the Administration a freer hand to construct a new policy with relatively little political costs.

Moreover, migration from Cuba has picked up pace in recent years, suggesting that the aging hardliners will continue to lose clout relative to voting power. According to the Institute of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, over 131,000 Cubans have arrived and settled in South Florida since 2005. n17 In fact, a policy that eventually normalizes relations with Cuba would probably carry votes in Florida, and the rest of the south. n18 These domestic changes mean that the U.S. can more easily reorient its Latin American policy to encourage constructive engagement that inspires optimism and hope rather than fear and anger.

Second, reforms recently enacted in Cuba indicate that the post Fidel Castro leadership is more likely to embrace pragmatism. In recent years, and especially since Raul Castro took over the presidency from his brother Fidel, Cuba's leadership has slightly moderated its political repression. While Cuba still holds political prisoners in custody, the total number is down from 316 in July 2006, when Raul took the helm from his brother, to less than 170 today - the lowest total since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. n19 However, these political changes have been small, and do not yet represent structural or fundamental reforms in the long term, especially since they are all easily reversible. Nevertheless, these political changes, combined with small economic liberalizations in the agricultural, technological, and tourist sectors, represent the first significant reforms under the new leadership of Raul Castro.

[\*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.

#### Should lift the embargo NOW - Sends a signal

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At this moment the United States is in the midst of a deep recession and several wars. I know you are searching for positive accomplishments in order to prepare for the 2012 elections. Improving the economy will require the assistance of everyone, so may I suggest a small step with substantial economic benefits: full legal recognition of Cuba. This island is our neighbor, only ninety miles from Key West.

Four critical considerations form the foundation of the argument for a full recognition of Cuba. First, economics. Because of our recession, all new trade is a good thing. From our side, we could export automobiles, motorcycles, heavy equipment, food, and electronics to Cuba.4 From Cuba, they could export rum, sugar, cigars, and music to the United States.5 Many of our citizens would love to visit Cuba and vice versa.6 Prior to the revolution, Cuba was a resort destination for many Americans. This new recognition is a win–win solution.7

Second, the three-hundred-pound gorilla at the table is the fact that Cuba is a communist government.8 But because President Nixon opened China to trade with the United States forty years ago, communism has become a nonissue.9 Today China is a huge trading partner10 and our largest creditor.11 The word communist is no longer used in a derogatory fashion. Indeed, Russia, a formerly communist nation, has adopted numerous democratic reforms, such as free elections.12 Quite simply, communism is no longer a threat to us—just the opposite. Clearly, the best way to further democracy is to trade with a country and encourage them to visit us in order to see how we live.13 The rest of the world is travelling to Cuba: Germany, Spain, Canada, and Austria, for example.14 Tourism is only a part of their trade. Recognition of Cuba would be a large step toward forging links with other nondemocratic countries.15

Third, as a community developer in Chicago, you, Mr. President, are keenly aware of the importance of encouraging everyone in the community to work together.16 Since 1962, we have been “walled-off” from Cuba.17 In the main, U.S. citizens are not permitted to visit or purchase products made in Cuba.18 Cuban visits to the United States are severely restricted, as well.19 We voice economic human rights but do nothing to change the legal foundation of our relationship with Cuba. Clearly, because of President Kennedy’s courageous stance, there are no Russian missiles in Cuba today.20 It is not an economic, political, or military threat.

Fourth, historically, a team of revolutionaries, including Che Guevara and the Castro brothers, overthrew the Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista.21 Fidel Castro was elected President of Cuba in 1976.22 Castro has been Cuba’s unchallenged leader since 1959, despite this later election, and one of his first accomplishments was to nationalize the private land and turn Cuba into a communist state.23 This nationalization of the land is the heart of our disagreement with Cuba today.

The state took the private land in Cuba and redistributed it to “other” Cuban citizens.24 That was over fifty years ago and is not likely to change, except perhaps through a negotiated settlement.25

A fair question is where the former owners of the Cuban land are. The answer is that many of them now live in Florida, although that is not completely accurate.26 Most of the elite former land owners are now deceased.27 It is their children who now wage “war” with Cuba and support the embargo.28 These surviving heirs fight to have their property returned. The offspring have an alternative solution at hand; they can sue for justice in the World Court.29 Of course, the surviving children of the exiles have selected a different path.

They lobby the U.S. Congress and elect Florida leaders who promise to keep up the fight and the “wall” with Cuba.30 But look at the cost to the United States. The economic embargo provides a foundation for the continuing rage of several thousand Cuban expatriates but, in the process, imprisons over 300 million American citizens.31

Mr. President, you have a unique opportunity to step up and tell the world and the children of the former land owners of Cuba that you will end the embargo now in order to grow the economies of the United States and Cuba. Tell them the “Cold War” is officially over, we are economic friends with China and Russia, and we should also be economic friends with our close neighbor, Cuba.32

President Obama, the time to end the sanctions against Cuba is now. The economic embargo has hurt us worse than it has Cuba. We are imprisoned in our own land and because of the embargo appear petty to the rest of the world.33

¡Cuba sí!